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Abstract. [Context.] The success of deep learning makes its usage tempt-
ing in safety-critical applications. However the development of such ap-
plications typically has requirements which do not allow the usage of
machine learning, in particular requirements traceability of software arti-
facts. [Problem.] Code constituting a neural network is not comparable
to classical code and requirements for applications where neural networks
are needed typically cannot be concretized into low-level requirements.
[Proposed solution.] We investigate the neural network equivalents of
code and low-level requirements and propose various traces that one
could consider as a replacement for classical notions. We also propose a
form of traceability in order to deal with the particular trial-and-error
development process for deep learning.
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1 Introduction
The success of deep learning (DL), in particular in computer vision, makes its
usage more and more tempting in many applications, including safety-critical
ones. However the development of such applications must follow standards (e.g.,
DO178 [1], ISO26262 [14]) which typically do not envision the usage of machine
learning. At the moment, practitioners therefore cannot use machine learning
for safety-critical functions (e.g., ASIL-D for ISO26262, or DAL-A for DO178).
There exist various attempts to address this issue whether in standardization
committees (e.g., ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 or DKE/DIN [28]) or in the academic
community (various initiatives towards explainable AI, e.g., [8]), but they are all
far from mature and definitely not usable as of today or do not really address the
problem: most standardization approaches just try to map one-to-one classical
software engineering processes like the V-model to deep learning. Furthermore,
no current academic approach provides a completely satisfying solution to the
lack of understandability of deep neural networks (DNN).
In this paper, we try to find a pragmatic approach, which focuses on arti-
facts rather than on processes: we are not prescriptive regarding the activities
which produce these artifacts. More precisely, we focus only on artifacts which
are worth being identified during the development of DNNs for the sake of trace-
ability. Consequently, this paper does not provide a ready-made solution, which
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a practitioner could follow one-to-one. However, it provides concrete descriptions
which could be sufficient to provide a first guidance.
We restrict the scope of this paper to the following:
– DNNs for supervised learning (no reinforcement learning, no unsupervised
learning).
– We focus only on software, not on system: traces from software requirements
to system requirements are out of scope, as is item-level hazard analysis.
– We do not focus on binary code or deployment thereof on hardware platform.
– We assume a fixed, non-evolving, dataset. This does not comply with most
real cases in, say, autonomous driving, where data is continuously collected.
Even if not continuously collected, the dataset has so much influence on the
training that one can hardly ignore its evolutions for proper traceability. Still,
there are already sufficiently many questions to address without considering
this evolution, which is why we leave this out of focus in this paper.
– We focus on functional requirements.
Lifting these restrictions is left to future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work.
Section 3 recalls the concept of traceability. Section 4 provides a traceability-
amenable presentation of deep learning. Section 5 contains the main contribution
of this paper: it analyzes which DNN artifacts replace classical software artifacts
and suggests new artifacts to enable the traceability of DNNs. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper and lists open questions for future research.
2 Related work
The usage of DNNs to support safety-critical functions is commonly recognized
as a huge challenge [7]. There are attempts towards the certification, verification,
or explainability of DNNs, of which we provide now a short overview. None of
them however addresses the traceability of DNNs.
Back in 1996 a set of requirements for a standard certifying the usage of
neural networks in safety critical applications was gathered [20]. Traceability is
(indirectly) mentioned as a problem to address, but no solution is provided.
In 1999, the classical waterfall model was adapted to the development of
DNNs [24]. Even though the problematic of traceability (in particular to the
data) is indirectly addressed, the proposed process is very much oriented towards
activities described in an informal manner, rather than on a concrete list of
artifacts to provide. The resulting process remains thus very high-level: there is
a large freedom of interpretation about what the artifacts shall actually contain,
which therefore does not provide enough information to trace DNNs.
There has been attempts to apply principles of software engineering to NNs
[27], in particular to address the lack of reproducibility in the development of
NNs. Even though the terminology and techniques have changed a lot since 2004,
the identified problems are still relevant. Yet, the solutions of the paper do not
answer the need for traceability and seem to hardly match nowadays’ practice.
The discrepancy between the recommendations of the ISO 26262 and the
methods actually used in practice has been analyzed [25]. This cannot be directly
used for traceability but is indirectly a very useful source of information.
A safety argumentation for the usage of DNNs, formalizing it partly using
GSN has been developed [15]. The abstraction level of this work is higher than
what we address in this work, meaning in particular that we cannot derive di-
rectly from it any notion of trace. The same applies for more recent work also
applying GSN in the context of NNs [6,10].
There are lots of heuristics, lessons learnt, best practices, all of which are
available from informal sources on the internet1 or analyses regarding the tech-
nical debt of machine learning [26]. None provide a concrete notion of traceability
but they help to analyze which information is worth tracing.
Interpretability and explainability of DNNs are very hot topics, with few
actual solutions at the moment, the most advanced ones provide rather hints of
solutions [22], Various such solutions have been gathered into a set of metrics
to use in order to assess a network [8]. None of these are entirely satisfying nor
do they relate directly to traceability. However they all could provide technical
insights in order to assess what should be traced or not.
Finally, there has been attempts to set grounds for a “rigorous science” of
machine learning [9]: again very useful, but not related to traceability. Many
safety-related problems have been identified for AI, especially for reinforcement
learning [3]. The identified challenges and corresponding attempts of solutions
are a potential source of inspiration to identify sources of problems and thus to
analyze whether those sources can be tackled via traceability.
3 Preliminary: Traceability
Traces and artifacts. We call any document delivered together with the soft-
ware an artifact. This includes executable code, source code, test results, de-
velopment plans and are usually defined by a standard, like ISO26262 [14] or
DO178C [1]). The delivered artifacts generally have dependencies between each
other: typically, the source code should fulfill requirements, software require-
ments should refine system requirements, executable code derives from source
code. Keeping these dependencies implicit increases the risk that a dependency
be wrong or forgotten. Traces are a concrete attempt to make these dependencies
explicit. Every pair of artifacts is in principle subject to being traced from/to
each other, but in this paper we consider especially traces from source code to
requirements. Consider for instance a requirement of ID, say, REQ 123 and a
piece of code defining a function, say, f 456 (see Fig. 1a). Then a typical trace is
nothing more than a comment just before the function simply stating [REQ 123]
(see line 6 in Fig. 1a). Writing down a trace is generally a manual activity: engi-
neers look up the code and requirements and add manually the comment above.
1 https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/rules-of-ml/ , https://
blog.slavv.com/37-reasons-why-your-neural-network-is-not-working-4020854bd607
1 // f 456 ta k e s :
2 // − x : . . .
4 // I t r e tu rns . . .
5 //
6 // [REQ 123 ]
7 int f 4 5 6 ( int x ) {
8 . . .
9 }
(a) Trace (b) Classical artifacts – inspired by the DO333 [2]
Fig. 1: Traces and artifacts
High- and low-level requirements. In many cases, requirements are not con-
crete or precise enough to be traced directly from the source code. One therefore
first refines the requirements into low-level requirements (LLR), which can be
traced from the code. The former requirements are then called high-level re-
quirements (HLR). As an example, the DO178C standard names define LLRs as
follows: “Low-level requirements are software requirements from which Source
Code can be directly implemented without further information.” [1]. LLR should
themselves be traced to HLR in order to have complete traceability.
Refining HLR into LLR goes hand in hand with architectural decisions: the
requirements can be decomposed only once the function is decomposed into
smaller functions, to which one assigns more concrete requirements. This is why
the DO178C refines the HLR into two artifacts: the LLRs on one hand, and the
Software Architecture on the other hand. The software architecture defines a set
of components and connections between these components (or, more precisely
at that stage, the interfaces of such components). In the following, we will call
the definition of such interfaces interface requirements (even if, in practice, they
are not necessarily explicitly defined as requirements). The LLRs can then be
mapped to each interface. Finally, the LLR and the software architecture should
be the only information necessary to write down the source code.
Fig. 1b represents the artifacts mentioned above (and others, especially re-
lated to verification). Of course, every artifact shall be traced to the artifact(s)
it refines, typically in a bi-directional manner: every piece of information found
in a refined artifact shall be found in the corresponding refining artifact, and
conversely, every piece of information – except design decisions – found in a
refining artifact shall be found in the refined one. In the DO178, the software
architecture is not traced back to the HLR because it is a design decision.
Rationale. Understanding the rationale behind traces (1) enables to under-
stand why it is challenging to trace DNNs, and (2) gives hints to investigate
relevant alternatives to classical traces. A trace serves the purpose of ensuring
that a piece of code is justified by a requirement, without being a structured
or formal justification. Actually, traces can be seen as a pragmatic approach to
support what one would actually like to express as a proper argumentation. They
at least enforce that people think about a justification. In fact, traceability does
enable to identify sources of error: when engineers fail to trace a piece of code
then they might discover that it is not necessary or, even worse, that it intro-
duces unwanted functionality. Conversely, if a requirement is not traced back by
to any code, then it is often a hint that its implementation was forgotten. For the
same reason, traceability is a tool for assessors to detect potential pitfalls during
development. This is what is illustrated in Fig. 1b by the bi-directional arrows
for traceability: having traces syntactically on each side is easy; it is however
harder to ensure coverage of traceability on both sides, e.g., all HLR are traced
to some LLR and all LLR are traced back to some HLR (the latter typically
does not happen since some LLRs depend on design decisions).
Some standards like, e.g., DO178C, do not impose an order on how artifacts
shall be developed. For instance, even though code shall be traced to require-
ments, it does not mean that one is forced to follow a waterfall model: one might
just as well work iteratively, define requirements, then code, then go back to re-
quirements, etc. An important point of traceability is that, no matter how one
reached the final state of development (e.g., iteratively or waterfall), it should
be possible to justify that this final state is coherent. Consequently, one might
very well develop all the artifacts without traceability, and only at the end de-
velop the traces (of course this is not recommended). This is why we emphasized
in introduction that this paper is not process- but artifact-oriented: we do not
impose how engineers should work but only what they should deliver.
4 Deep learning artifacts
This section presents concepts and terms related to deep learning, in a way that
makes them amenable to comparison with the artifacts of the previous section.
To implement a required function using a DNN, one needs:
– A dataset containing both instances of the input, e.g., images, and of the
output, e.g., annotations denoting bounding boxes for pedestrians’ positions
(see, e.g., Fig. 2a). In the following, we will consider both separately: the raw
dataset for the input, and the labels for the corresponding expected output.
– A neural network architecture. A DNN is a function typically structured as
a sequence of parallel operations transforming the input. This sequence of
operations has the form of a layer-based architecture. It plays an essential
role in distinguishing competing networks and results from the ingenuity of
the deep learning engineer. See Fig. 2b for a classical example.
– A loss function. During the learning process, if a DNN predicts a value that
turns out to be wrong, it does not simply change its weights so that it gets
suddenly right, rather it tries to get closer to the solution. There are various
reasons for that, but all that matters for this paper is that engineers shall
define “closer”: to do so, they define a socalled loss function providing a
positive real number telling how wrong the system is. The corresponding
code influences the learning but does not go into the final product.
All of these are provided to a DL framework which takes care of generating
a trained network (e.g., TensorFlow2 or PyTorch3). It is essential not just to
(a) An example from an
object recognition dataset,
with bounding boxes and
types of objects plotted into
the image (from [13])
(b) Architecture of LeNet, an early and well-known DNN
architecture to classify hand-written characters (from
[16])
Fig. 2: Bounding boxes and DNN architecture
understand the artifacts themselves, but how they are developed. Typically, the
sequence of decisions are as follows:
1. Collect data and preprocess it: re-shape the information, fix missing values,
extract features. Delivered artifacts: raw dataset, preprocessing functions.
2. Annotate the raw data. Delivered artifact: labelled dataset.
3. Split the labelled dataset into training, validation and testing datasets. The
difference between the two latter is that one uses the evaluation on the valida-
tion dataset in order to improve the DNN design, whereas the testing dataset
is used only once no more iteration is planned, to assess the final quality of
the DNN.4 Delivered artifacts: train, validation and test datasets.
4. Design the architecture. Delivered artifact: DNN architecture.
5. Define the “learning configuration” (non-standard term), i.e., all remain-
ing aspects influencing the learning process: loss, learning parameters (e.g.,
2 https://www.tensorflow.org/
3 https://pytorch.org/
4 These terms are here used a bit opposite to their classical usage in a safety context.
dropout, learning rate, maximum steps), hyper-parameters, or, at lower level:
random seeds, versions of software and hardware used for training. Overall,
the configuration shall be the minimal piece of information so that, together
with the training set and the architecture, they characterize uniquely the
learned DNN. Delivered artifact: Typically scattered across different ar-
tifacts: e.g., parameters stored in code, loss having its own source file, etc.
Ideally, this should be gathered in centralized files [12].
6. Train the DNN architecture. Delivered artifact: (trained) weight values.5
7. Post-process the trained DNN (if necessary): many learning strategies require
a change between learning and inference phase (e.g., dropout is applied only
during learning). Delivered artifact: inference architecture.6
8. Test the resulting DNN on the validation dataset. Delivered artifact: test
results (e.g., real number representing accuracy).
9. Change the architecture or the learn configuration (4–5) based on the results
and repeat steps 6–9 until the targeted objectives are reached.
10. Assess the quality with the test set. Delivered artifact: final metric value.
11. Depending on the used framework, serialize/export the network in order to
use it in production, e.g., to be linked from a C++ source file, and compile
it. Delivered artifact: executable code usable in production.
Similarly to code, the produced DNN is obtained by trial-and-error. Contrarily to
code however, the resulting DNN typically cannot be understood without looking
at the changes which led to it. Often, it is even the only way to understand why
a DNN is finally obtained. This has of course a big impact on justifiability of a
DNN and therefore on traceability, as we will see in Section 5.2.
5 Tracing DL artifacts
To devise traces for DNNs, it is helpful to map classical development (Section
3) with DL development (Section 4). To do so, we analyze, for all artifacts of
Fig. 1b, which DL artifact plays a similar role. Some artifacts are easy: System
requirements and HLR are present independently of using DL or not — either
way, one needs requirements both at the system level and for the software. The
same applies to Executable object code: either way, the final product is code.
Much more difficult is the case of Software architecture and LLR: Our po-
sition is that HLRs that are implemented with DNNs generally cannot be refined
into a software architecture and an LLR. Indeed, if this were the case, then en-
gineers could themselves decompose the problem into subproblems, which could
in turn be manually implemented. However, DNNs are precisely used when no
such engineered decomposition is successful; this is in particular the case in com-
puter vision, where decades of human engineering were outperformed by DNNs,
5 This artifact is memory rather code: training does not alter the code itself, but only
the memory values of the variables used by the code.
6 Here, on the opposite, the code theoretically changes but not the weights. In practice,
though, the code remains a same and the switch between training and inference mode
is controlled by a simple boolean flag, so there is no need for separate artifacts.
which precisely came up “themselves” with more relevant decompositions. Note
that this is not particularly a property of DNNs per se, but rather of the func-
tions for which it makes sense to use DNNs. As mentioned earlier, according to
DO178C, the LLR shall contain sufficient information to write down the code.
We therefore suggest to substitute LLR and software architecture with all the
information, which suffices for the DL framework to generate code: Training
dataset, DNN architecture and learning configuration.
Regarding Source code, a simple position is to consider that there is still
source code at the end. However, as mentioned in Section 4, the outcome of the
DL framework is rather memory values than code: the code itself is still code,
which was written by the DL engineer to specify the architecture. We suggest
therefore to split the source code block into the part that is manually written
and the part that is generated: Inference architecture (which, as mentioned
earlier, need not be different than the DNN architecture) and Weight values.
The result yields Fig. 3a. Note that high-level tests are now replaced by the
testing/validation set: the name differs but the role is the same. An important
difference is that, contrarily to classical test, one cannot expect 100% passed
tests: it is in the nature of the functions solved using NNs that they are not
perfect. Low-level tests disappear since there are no more LLR.
(a) DNN artifacts (b) Integration of domain coverage model
Fig. 3: Adaptations of Fig. 1b for DNN
We consider traces between these artifacts, more precisely between: HLR and
training dataset (resp. learning configuration, resp. architecture), source code
and training dataset (resp. learning configuration, resp. architecture). Some are
simple: e.g., inference architecture to learning architecture (when not the same
anyway) and to no other design artifact, or between the training dataset version
and the learnt weights (indeed, it is easy in practice to lose track of which version
of a dataset was used to train a given network).7
7 Beyond the scope of this paper but also essential is the traceability between a dataset
and its sources, e.g., sensors calibration setup or sensor driver versions.
Tracing other artifacts is much more challenging and the next sections are
dedicated to this problem: the next section deals with traces between HLR and
training dataset, the following section deals with all other traces.
5.1 Traceability between HLR and training dataset
Traces between HLR and dataset may seem simple: one just needs to trace
every element of the dataset to the HLR. Consider, e.g., the HLR “The function
shall recognize obstacles in urban context”. In principle, it is simple to trace
the dataset to such requirements: e.g., pictures in the dataset taken in urban
context shall be traced to the corresponding requirement. However, the sort of
information usually found in an HLR often applies uniformly to all elements of
the dataset: e.g., if the function shall work only in urban context then all images
of the dataset will be urban. This would entail tracing the entire dataset to the
HLR, which would be so general that it would not really support the rationale of
tracing: it would not provide any form of justification of this particular dataset.
Instead, one expects every datum to be justified and thus traced individually.
Domain coverage model. In practice, HLR are not refined enough to allow
such a fine-granular traceability. Instead, we propose a new artifact between HLR
and dataset: the “domain coverage model”. This model shall provide a decompo-
sition of the domain of the HLR in such a way that various elements of the dataset
can be traced to different components of this decomposition. For instance, for
the example above, “urban” is not enough: one should detail the different forms
of environment that are encountered: e.g., “one-way street”, “roundabout”, etc.
(in that case, the model connects strongly with the Operational Design Domain
– ODD – but it needs not be the case if the function to be performed by the
DNN does not directly work with data coming from the sensors). Every piece of
data matching the corresponding part of the domain model shall be then traced
to it. These parts should be themselves traced towards the HLR.8
If working in a very structured context, e.g., where model-based requirements
engineering is used [19], the domain coverage model could be formalized to some
extent. In such cases, coupling it with the prior definition of a coverage criterion
comes in close connection with coverage-driven verification [5] or model-based
testing [18]. The difference with these classical approaches is merely the size and
diversity of the model, which is much bigger in DL than in classical engineering.
Similar approaches have been proposed for machine learning in the literature,
see e.g., [21], but to a smaller and less systematic extent. The domain model is a
similar to a plant in control engineering: it models the environment, but without
its dynamics. Fig. 3b reflects the new artifact and the corresponding traceability.
Note that, even though the discussion above targets especially the raw dataset,
the same applies to the labels if their domain is complex enough: for instance,
8 This might be a useful tool to identify misunderstandings regarding the environment,
e.g., is a portion of highway which is within the limits of a city considered urban?
if the DNN shall provide the position on a pedestrian, then it is important to
ensure that the domain of positions is adequately covered.
How detailed is detailed enough? It is typically very hard for a require-
ment engineer to know beforehand which level of granularity to put in such an
domain coverage model. Actually the level of granularity probably depends on
the dataset itself, and can thus be identified only once the dataset is already (or
at least partially) present: this is counter-intuitive regarding the usual notion
of requirement. However, as mentioned, we do not focus on the order in which
artifacts are delivered but only on ensuring their mutual consistency. In this
respect, it is acceptable to generate or modify a posteriori such a requirement.
To find out the proper level of granularity, one shall keep in mind that such a
domain coverage model shall serve as a tool to analyze the dataset by justifying
why a particular datum is in it and identifying cases where some situation might
not be covered. Consequently, if too many pieces of data trace to the same
domain model part, then this part is probably defined with a too high-level of
granularity and traceability is useless. Conversely, if too few pieces of data trace
to one domain model part, then this part is probably defined with a too low-
level of granularity and coverage will not be reachable as displayed in Fig. 3a:
the traceability arrow between HLR and dataset is not bidirectional.
Defining “too many” or “too few” is beyond the scope of this paper, but
should of course be defined in a rigorous manner depending on the context. If
this approach turns out convincing, we actually suspect that coverage domain
modelling will become a non-trivial engineering phase of its own.
5.2 Trial-and-error traces
All remaining traces relate to the main DL artifacts: weights, learning configura-
tion, architecture, training dataset. A na¨ıve solution consists in tracing weights
to dataset elements: this can be performed automatically by the DL framework
by tracing to the dataset elements, which influence a given weight “the most” [7].
Even though doable in theory, this approach is irrelevant in practice, it is ac-
knowledged as impossible – at least as of today – to interpret the role of one
particular neuron. This sort of traces will thus not fulfill the traceability ratio-
nale: if a reviewer inspects the involved artifacts in their state at the end of the
project, they will not understand them nor their connection to previous artifacts.
Note that this is a problem classically encountered with code generators, which
cannot be trusted without any argumentation. Unlike “classically” generated
code though, DNNs cannot be understood by manual inspection.
Trial and error. Instead of waiting for explainable AI to provide solutions,
we suggest in this paper to trace the engineers’ decisions instead of the artifacts
themselves: if artifacts are not understandable, engineers’ decisions shall be.
How do engineers come up with architectures or learning configurations? They
essentially try them, test them, and try again until they cannot improve the
results anymore. In other words, these decisions are intrinsically based on trial-
and-error: see Fig. 4a for an illustration. In classical software engineering, trial
(a) Trial-and-error (b) Corresponding extension of Fig. 3b
Fig. 4: Trial and error
and error is not considered for traceability, it is actually rather the opposite: one
expects from traceability that we can ensure the coherence of the artifacts in
their final state, i.e., independently of how they were obtained, by trial-and-error
or not. However, DNN development relies so intrinsically on trial-and-error, that
we feel necessary to embrace this kind of activity even for traceability. Future
developments might provide more predictable and reproducible approaches to
the development of DNNs, in which case the approach of the present section
will become obsolete. At the moment this paper is written, the present approach
shall be considered as a pragmatic attempt that can be applied today.
In case of trial-and-error, the only justification that one can provide is that a
given artifact is better than its previous version. We thus propose to trace every
new artifact obtained by trial-and-error to its previous version. This requires
storing not only the final artifact but also all the previous versions of it, which is
done already in a standard manner in the context of configuration management
and using version control. Pairing configuration management with traceability
forces the engineer to do more than just tagging a new version in their version
control system: they must also think about the justification of the new increment.
Metric. To apply this approach, it is essential to define what “better” means,
we introduce therefore an additional metric artifact to measure the quality of
the inference DNN – which engineers anyways normally do. Such a metric should
be defined according to the function (e.g., we allow a car to be mistaken for a
pedestrian, but not the other way around) and can range from simple cases like
accuracy and/or recall to complex combinations of functions [8]. There should be
only one metric, but there are several metric values. These values shall be traced
to the weight values and inference architecture with which these were obtained.
The essential addition is then to require that every version of the network which
is obtained by increment of a previous one shall be traced to the metric value
obtained with this previous version: one can then easily check if the new value
indeed is an improvement. If the metric changes during the project or is defined
only a posteriori, then one needs to re-check the entire trial-and-error chain
leading to the final version of the DNN. Fig. 4b summarizes these additions.
This process is a big hindrance for the practitioner, but: (1) not providing an
argumentation for a claimed improvement is recognized as a problem by the DL
community itself (see “Explanation vs Speculation” in [17]), and (2) it is much
easier to apply than any approach currently taken in the field of explainable AI.
Limitations. In its current state, our proposition can be “tricked”: a developer
can deliver only their last trial and claim that it was, by chance, the first one.
A way to circumvent this, is to impose some restrictions on the first delivered
version, e.g., imposing that it belong to a catalogue of authorized “primitive”
DNNs. A developer cannot then just deliver immediately a complex DNN with-
out tracing it to a previous primitive one. This still would not be enough: once
again, a developer can silent all the intermediate developed versions and trace
directly from the last to the first version, which goes against the intent of our
approach. To circumvent this, one could restrict allowed increments: e.g., adding
only one layer at a time, having a default size for layers, etc. This might be too
restrictive in practice: some DNNs only show their benefits after having added
a certain number of layers, but all the smaller versions with less layers are all
equally bad. Investigating such restrictions goes beyond the present paper.
6 Conclusion and open questions
We addressed the traceability of DNNs in a pragmatic manner: we analyzed the
parallels and differences between DNNs and classical software development, and
proposed accordingly adaptations of the notion of trace for DNNs. Instead of
blindly mapping classical software activities to DL activities, which would lead
to mismatches with the practice of DL, we tried to embrace some specificities
of “real-life” DL, in particular trial-and-error. We provided a solution, which we
believe supports the rationale of traceability and is applicable for practitioners.
Yet, there remain various open questions, which now list.
Gap between trained and inference DNN. The process of Section 4
assumes that trained and inference DNNs have the same input/output types.
This is not always true: one might train a sub-part of the final network in an
unsupervised manner, to learn features potentially valuable for later supervised
training [4]. One might also train a DNN on a separate dataset or take an already-
trained DNN and remove the latest layers (the most task-specific ones) to adapt
the DNN to the targeted functionality. In such cases, intermediate steps are not
connected to the final task and thus not traceable in the sense considered so far.
Dataset. An important aspect is the evolution of the dataset: we assumed so
far that the dataset is fixed. In reality, many systems gather new data along their
lifetime. In such cases, one should consider a form of incremental traceability,
i.e., how to trace new data as it comes along? In particular, one might need to
argue why adding a new datum indeed provides additional valuable information.
Explainable AI. As mentioned from the beginning, we took a pragmatic
approach in this paper, leaving aside explainable AI, which is currently not
mature enough (see, e.g., [8] for a short review). However, as the field develops,
it will be valuable to discover new opportunities for relevant traces.
Classical AI. Various approaches attempt to mix deep learning with expert
knowledge [11,23] are promising for safety-critical systems because they allow
to control the learning process and hence to argue better about the resulting
functionality. In some sense, one can interpret this as a form of explainability-
by-design. Even though they do not reflect the state of the practice, it would be
valuable to consider how to trace artifacts added by these methods.
Intellectual property. In automotive or avionics, the development of the
system is distributed among various stakeholders. In such cases, it is also essential
that all stakeholders keep their intellectual property. This can be problematic for
our approach to trial-and-error activities which forces practitioners to provide
artifact evolutions which might reveal their production secrets.
A Reviews
This paper was submitted and rejected at SAFECOMP 2019. To help the reader
better assess the contribution of this work, we include the anonymous reviews
verbatim (no grades were provided).
A.1 Review 1
This paper addresses the very important problem of using Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) in safety-critical applications. Many people are working on this problem,
including so-called self-explaining AI. These authors describe a more pragmatic
approach that can be applied today, before the other techniques being studied
are ready for prime time. It involves applying a classical approach of traceability
to the artifacts of deep learning. Arguing that traceability, at its best, forces
the developer to explain why things were done (rationale) and helps to find
design shortcomings (e.g. requirements never implemented), the authors propose
that transposing the traceability concept to DNNs could offer some of the same
advantages.
In order to develop this concept, it was necessary for the authors to im-
pose some rather severe restrictions, which certainly circumscribe the practical
usefulness of their ideas. On the other hand, it permits them to discuss some
interesting possibilities for immediate application of the traceability technique
already today. They present ideas about what the artifacts might be in the case
of DNNs. They deal with the problem of the fact that DNNs today basically
evolve by trial and error but face it head-on with proposals for handling this,
including for example the idea of a metric that must justify how the evolution
of the DNN was better than the previous one.
Overall, I believe that the paper represents an interesting attempt to see
what traceability of DNNs could look like when applied to DNNs as they stand
today. The authors honestly list a number of obstacles and questions that must
be answered in the future, but I believe that the paper could generate some
useful discussions at SAFECOMP.
A.2 Review 2
Initial ideas and work on traceability of DNNs for safety-critical applications.
Strong limitation of scope. Further work is needed for application Chapter 2 pro-
vides an compact but excellent summary of recent, related work on the subject.
The list of references is very comprehensive. Chapter 3 is a well summary on the
motivation (mostly linked to DO178C) and approaches of requirements trace-
ability. It needs to mentioned that not only DO178C but also ISO26262 do not
enforce the order in which software artefacts are created during development.
It would have been worth mentioning clause 7 and figure 9 of ISO26262-10 2nd
Ed. chapter 4 describes the step by step approach on training a DNN. Chapter 5
aims on mapping the approach described in chapter 3 to the DNN development
as described in chapter 4. It newly proposes a ”domain coverage model” as a
refinement of high level requirements to trace from HLR to the training data
set. But at the end this does not give any confidence that a trained DNN will
fulfill its HLR. The chapter is a very good discussion on the problems that occur
when transforming the idea traceability to the development of DNNs. The final
proposal to trace all versions of the network (generated during training) together
with the increment in the metric value is a excellent combination of design and
testing traceability.
Ref. 14 shall be corrected: ”ISO 26262: Road vehicles ”. Please check for any
updates of the paper w.r.t 2nd Ed. from 2018.
A.3 Review 3
The paper introduces an approach for tracing requirements to code if DNNs are
used instead of conventional code. The authors introduce a concept they call a
domain coverage model replacing low-level requirements and they recommend
to trace the developers’ decisions during the trial-and-error-cycles instead of
architectural/structural code properties.
The paper is sometimes quite difficult to read so that is not clear what the
authors actually want to express. It should definitely be proof-read by a native
speaker. Overall, the paper leaves a rather immature impression - content-wise
and presentation-wise.
I’m not completely sure about the actual contribution of the paper. The au-
thors self-confidently explain that all the related work is rather immature and not
usable for their purpose. After that, they provide a brief introduction to trace-
ability in general. Than they illustrate the differences between a conventional
development process and the process used for creating DNN-based software. Fi-
nally, they eventually come to what could be the contribution: They recommend
to use a domain coverage model instead of low-level-requirements. This model
looks quite similar to models describing operational situations such as ODD or
approaches used for deriving test scenarios, but according to the authors it seems
to be different. Unfortunately, they do not provide more than about half a page
roughly describing the general idea. Instead of tracing to weights, training sets
etc., the authors also recommend to trace to the developers’ decisions, i.e. to
a rationale why and how the changes! of the net lead to better results. Again,
there is not more than about half a page roughly explaining what the authors
mean. They furthermore explain that this approach requires a metrics for mea-
suring what ”better” actually means. But there a lot of ”shoulds”, i.e., how the
metric should be, rather than concrete suggestions for a concrete metric or even
evaluations of their metric.
Overall, the paper looks rather immature. The authors describe a rather
rough idea and it remains rather unclear how that idea concretely looks like.
Moreover, the paper’s presentation requires a lot of polishing.
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